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3 Moral Relativism: Copp's Mixed Theory (SEP) by Chris Gowans

3   MORAL RELATIVISM by Chris Gowans (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

7. Mixed Positions: A Rapprochement between Relativists and Objectivists? (excerpt)


David Copp (1995) maintains that it is true that something is morally wrong only if it is wrong in relation to the justified moral code of some society, and a code is justified in a society only if the society would be rationally required to select it. Since which code it would be rationally [34] required to select depends in part on the non-moral values of the society, and since these values differ from one society to another, something may be morally wrong for one society but not for another. Copp calls this position a form of moral relativism. However, he believes this relativism is significantly mitigated by the fact that which code a society is rationally required to select also depends on the basic needs of the society. Copp thinks all societies have the same basic needs. For example, every society has a need to maintain its population and system of cooperation from one generation to the next. Moreover, since meeting these basic needs is the most fundamental factor in determining the rationality of selecting a code, Copp thinks the content of all justified moral codes will tend to be quite similar. For instance, any such code will require that persons's basic needs for such things as physical survival, self-respect and friendship be promoted (these are said to be necessary for minimal rational agency). The theory is mixed insofar as the rationality of selecting a code depends partly on common features of human nature (basic needs) and partly on diverse features of different societies (values). Whether or not justified moral codes (and hence moral truths) would tend to be substantially similar, despite differences, as Copp argues, would depend on both the claim that all societies have the same basic needs and the claim that these needs are much more important than other values in determining which moral code it is rational for a society to select.


Copp, D., 1995, Morality, Normativity, and Society, New York: Oxford University Press.

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COMMENT: The truth of cultural (i.e., ethical) relativism is a complicated question. Just when you think it is dead and buried, a new version pops us which tries to avoid the weaknesses of earlier versions. What I would point out with respect to the “mixed positions” (like David Copp’s) which try to find some room for objective principles, it is possible that that is all the defender of universal IHR needs. Once Copp “admits the existence and moral relevance of “basic needs” and says that “all societies have the same basic needs,” the he has opened the door to universal human rights.



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