2 MORAL RELATIVISM by Chris Gowans (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
2. Forms and Arguments
In general, the term ‘relativism’ refers to many different ideas. For example, in anthropology it sometimes connotes, among other things, the rather uncontroversial notion that anthropologists should strive to be impartial and unprejudiced in their empirical inquires. However, in moral philosophy ‘relativism’ is usually taken to suggest an empirical, a metaethical, or a normative position. The empirical position is usually:
Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR). As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be. [5]
Sometimes what is emphasized is moral diversity rather than strict disagreement. DMR is often thought to have been established by anthropology and other empirical disciplines. However, it is not uncontroversial: Empirical as well as philosophical objections have been raised against it. Hence, it is one focal point of debate.
The metaethical position usually concerns the truth or justification of moral judgments, and it has been given somewhat different definitions. Metaethical relativists generally suppose that many fundamental moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, and on this basis they argue that moral judgments lack the moral authority or normative force that moral objectivists usually contend these judgments may have. Hence, metaethical relativism is in part a negative thesis that challenges the claims of moral objectivists. However, it often involves a positive thesis as well, namely that moral judgments nonetheless have moral authority or normative force, not absolutely or universally (as objectivists contend), but relative to some group of persons such as a society or culture. This point is typically made with respect to truth or justification (or both), and the following definition will be a useful reference point:
Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.
With respect to truth-value, this means that a moral judgment such as ‘Polygamy is morally wrong’ may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another. It is not true, or false, simply speaking. Likewise, with respect to justification, this judgment may be justified in one society, but not another. Taken in one way, this last point is uncontroversial: The people in one society may have different evidence available to them than the people in the other society. But proponents of MMR usually have [6] something stronger and more provocative in mind: That the standards of justification in the two societies may differ from one another and that there is no rational basis for resolving these differences. This is why the justification of moral judgments is relative rather than absolute.
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of different formulations of relativism (for discussion of some of these, see Krausz 2011 and López de Sa 2011). It is important to note several distinctions that may be made in formulating different metaethical relativist positions. First, a distinction is sometimes drawn between content relativism, the view that sentences may have different contents (meanings) in different frameworks, and truth relativism, the view that sentences have the same content in different frameworks, but their truth-value may vary across these frameworks (for a discussion of this distinction in terms of moral relativism, see Prinz 2007: 180-3). In the discussions that follow, truth relativism is ordinarily assumed. Second, it is sometimes said that the truth or justification of moral judgments may be relative to an individual person as well as a group of persons. In this article, the latter will be assumed, as in the definition of MMR, unless otherwise noted. Third, that to which truth or justification is relative may be the persons making the moral judgments or the persons about whom the judgments are made. These are sometimes called appraiser and agent relativism respectively. Appraiser relativism suggests that we do or should make moral judgments on the basis of our own standards, while agent relativism implies that the relevant standards are those of the persons we are judging (of course, in some cases these may coincide). Appraiser relativism is the more common position, and it will usually be assumed in the discussion that follows. Finally, MMR may be offered as the best explanation of what people already believe, or it may be put forward as a position people ought to accept regardless of what they now believe. There will be occasion to discuss both claims below, though the latter is probably the more common one. [7]
Metaethical moral relativist positions are typically contrasted with moral objectivism. Let us say that moral objectivism maintains that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person. There are different ways of challenging moral objectivism. Moral skepticism says that we are never justified in accepting or rejecting moral judgments.
Other views–variously called moral non-cognitivism, expressivism, antirealism, nihilism, etc.--contend that moral judgments lack truth-value, at least beyond the truth-value implied by the minimalist claim that to assert that S is true is simply to assert S (a related view, the error theory, claims that moral judgments are always false). MMR is often distinguished from all of these views: Instead of denying truth-value or justification, it affirms relative forms of these. However, metaethical moral relativist views are sometimes regarded as connected with positions that say moral judgments lack truth-value, since the relativist views contend that moral judgments lack truth-value in an absolute or universal sense. This is sometimes simply a question of terminology, but not always. If it is said that moral judgments lack truth-value (beyond the claim of minimalism), then there cannot be relative truth-value in the sense that moral relativists usually intend (though it might be contended that there is a sens e in which there could still be justification). As will be seen below, there is a debate about the relationship between MMR and non-cognitivist or expressivist positions.
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COMMENT: The author frequently says that MMR is the denial any “absolute or universal” moral truths (so it also denies that any moral rights are “absolute or universal.” I think that the use of the word ‘absolute’ is unfortunate. What does ‘absolute’ mean? If anything, it means ‘no exceptions.” So if there is an absolute human right against torture, that must mean that the right has no exceptions, that torture is never morally justified because it always violates a human right. But are there any (human) rights that are absolute in the sense of no exceptions? Is the right not to be raped absolute/no exceptions? If the right not to be killed absolute/no exceptions?
I think we ought to focus on the question whether there are any universal (or universally valid) moral principles or rights. It is possible that the right against being tortured is universal, but it is not absolute in the sense of no exceptions. (Some people believe that torture is justified in ‘ticking time bomb’ situations.) If we conflate universality and absoluteness, then it would be incoherent to say that the right against torture is universal but not absolute.
I think that the drafters of the UDHR believed that the rights they listed were universal (universally) valid, but not necessarily that they were absolute (no exceptions). How could they believe that the rights to life and liberty (Art. 3) have no exceptions? Killing in a just war (e.g., defending against the Nazis) is a human rights violation? Imprisoning convicted Nazi war criminals was a violation of their human rights?
And obviously, if it is possible for two human rights to conflict, we don’t want to say that when we must violate (or infringe) one of them, we are guilty of a human rights violation. (For the distinction between violate and infringe, see my blog: https://philosophyhr.blogspot.com/.)
Perhaps the rights against torture and genocide are absolute (because they are jus cogens), but that cannot be true of most (or all) other rights in the UDHR and the two original Covenants. If two absolute rights conflict, doesn’t one have to give way (so it is not actually absolute)?
2. Forms and Arguments
In general, the term ‘relativism’ refers to many different ideas. For example, in anthropology it sometimes connotes, among other things, the rather uncontroversial notion that anthropologists should strive to be impartial and unprejudiced in their empirical inquires. However, in moral philosophy ‘relativism’ is usually taken to suggest an empirical, a metaethical, or a normative position. The empirical position is usually:
Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR). As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be. [5]
Sometimes what is emphasized is moral diversity rather than strict disagreement. DMR is often thought to have been established by anthropology and other empirical disciplines. However, it is not uncontroversial: Empirical as well as philosophical objections have been raised against it. Hence, it is one focal point of debate.
The metaethical position usually concerns the truth or justification of moral judgments, and it has been given somewhat different definitions. Metaethical relativists generally suppose that many fundamental moral disagreements cannot be rationally resolved, and on this basis they argue that moral judgments lack the moral authority or normative force that moral objectivists usually contend these judgments may have. Hence, metaethical relativism is in part a negative thesis that challenges the claims of moral objectivists. However, it often involves a positive thesis as well, namely that moral judgments nonetheless have moral authority or normative force, not absolutely or universally (as objectivists contend), but relative to some group of persons such as a society or culture. This point is typically made with respect to truth or justification (or both), and the following definition will be a useful reference point:
Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.
With respect to truth-value, this means that a moral judgment such as ‘Polygamy is morally wrong’ may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another. It is not true, or false, simply speaking. Likewise, with respect to justification, this judgment may be justified in one society, but not another. Taken in one way, this last point is uncontroversial: The people in one society may have different evidence available to them than the people in the other society. But proponents of MMR usually have [6] something stronger and more provocative in mind: That the standards of justification in the two societies may differ from one another and that there is no rational basis for resolving these differences. This is why the justification of moral judgments is relative rather than absolute.
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of different formulations of relativism (for discussion of some of these, see Krausz 2011 and López de Sa 2011). It is important to note several distinctions that may be made in formulating different metaethical relativist positions. First, a distinction is sometimes drawn between content relativism, the view that sentences may have different contents (meanings) in different frameworks, and truth relativism, the view that sentences have the same content in different frameworks, but their truth-value may vary across these frameworks (for a discussion of this distinction in terms of moral relativism, see Prinz 2007: 180-3). In the discussions that follow, truth relativism is ordinarily assumed. Second, it is sometimes said that the truth or justification of moral judgments may be relative to an individual person as well as a group of persons. In this article, the latter will be assumed, as in the definition of MMR, unless otherwise noted. Third, that to which truth or justification is relative may be the persons making the moral judgments or the persons about whom the judgments are made. These are sometimes called appraiser and agent relativism respectively. Appraiser relativism suggests that we do or should make moral judgments on the basis of our own standards, while agent relativism implies that the relevant standards are those of the persons we are judging (of course, in some cases these may coincide). Appraiser relativism is the more common position, and it will usually be assumed in the discussion that follows. Finally, MMR may be offered as the best explanation of what people already believe, or it may be put forward as a position people ought to accept regardless of what they now believe. There will be occasion to discuss both claims below, though the latter is probably the more common one. [7]
Metaethical moral relativist positions are typically contrasted with moral objectivism. Let us say that moral objectivism maintains that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person. There are different ways of challenging moral objectivism. Moral skepticism says that we are never justified in accepting or rejecting moral judgments.
Other views–variously called moral non-cognitivism, expressivism, antirealism, nihilism, etc.--contend that moral judgments lack truth-value, at least beyond the truth-value implied by the minimalist claim that to assert that S is true is simply to assert S (a related view, the error theory, claims that moral judgments are always false). MMR is often distinguished from all of these views: Instead of denying truth-value or justification, it affirms relative forms of these. However, metaethical moral relativist views are sometimes regarded as connected with positions that say moral judgments lack truth-value, since the relativist views contend that moral judgments lack truth-value in an absolute or universal sense. This is sometimes simply a question of terminology, but not always. If it is said that moral judgments lack truth-value (beyond the claim of minimalism), then there cannot be relative truth-value in the sense that moral relativists usually intend (though it might be contended that there is a sens e in which there could still be justification). As will be seen below, there is a debate about the relationship between MMR and non-cognitivist or expressivist positions.
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COMMENT: The author frequently says that MMR is the denial any “absolute or universal” moral truths (so it also denies that any moral rights are “absolute or universal.” I think that the use of the word ‘absolute’ is unfortunate. What does ‘absolute’ mean? If anything, it means ‘no exceptions.” So if there is an absolute human right against torture, that must mean that the right has no exceptions, that torture is never morally justified because it always violates a human right. But are there any (human) rights that are absolute in the sense of no exceptions? Is the right not to be raped absolute/no exceptions? If the right not to be killed absolute/no exceptions?
I think we ought to focus on the question whether there are any universal (or universally valid) moral principles or rights. It is possible that the right against being tortured is universal, but it is not absolute in the sense of no exceptions. (Some people believe that torture is justified in ‘ticking time bomb’ situations.) If we conflate universality and absoluteness, then it would be incoherent to say that the right against torture is universal but not absolute.
I think that the drafters of the UDHR believed that the rights they listed were universal (universally) valid, but not necessarily that they were absolute (no exceptions). How could they believe that the rights to life and liberty (Art. 3) have no exceptions? Killing in a just war (e.g., defending against the Nazis) is a human rights violation? Imprisoning convicted Nazi war criminals was a violation of their human rights?
And obviously, if it is possible for two human rights to conflict, we don’t want to say that when we must violate (or infringe) one of them, we are guilty of a human rights violation. (For the distinction between violate and infringe, see my blog: https://philosophyhr.blogspot.com/.)
Perhaps the rights against torture and genocide are absolute (because they are jus cogens), but that cannot be true of most (or all) other rights in the UDHR and the two original Covenants. If two absolute rights conflict, doesn’t one have to give way (so it is not actually absolute)?
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