4 MORAL RELATIVISM by Chris Gowans (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
8. Relativism and Tolerance
Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position, usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards those with whom they morally disagree. The most prominent normative position in this connection concerns tolerance. In recent years, the idea that we should be tolerant has been increasingly accepted in some circles. At the same time, others have challenged this idea, and the philosophical understanding and justification of tolerance has become less obvious (see Heyd 1996 and the entry on toleration). The question here is whether moral relativism has something to contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR or MMR provide support for tolerance (for discussion, see Graham 1996, Harrison 1976, Ivanhoe 2009, Kim and Wreen 2003, Prinz 2007: pp. 207-13 and Wong 1984: ch. 12). In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. The context of discussion is often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does moral relativism provide support for tolerance in this sense?
Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers generally think they are mistaken. DMR may provide the occasion for tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory or even permissible. DMR simply tells us there are moral disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. (A mixed position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.)
It might be said that MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even this is problematic. According to MMR, understood to [42] concern truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society. Hence, the statement, “people ought to be tolerant” (T), may be true in some societies and false in others. MMR by itself does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact have the result that T is false in some societies (a similar point may be made with respect to justification).
Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can establish this as an objective moral truth (for example, by drawing on arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill). To the objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance (or imperialism), objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should interfere with it. Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance.
Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle alone. Such an approach has been proposed by Wong (1984: ch. 12). The principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them (if they were rational and well-informed in relevant respects). Wong called this “the justification principle.” Of course, it is already a tolerance principle of sorts. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct. Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is false and unjustified in another society in which the press is restricted for the good of the community. In this case, given MMR, our society might not be able to justify interference to the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any justification we could give would appeal to values that are authoritative for us, not hem, and no appeal to logic or facts alone would give them a reason to accept our justification.
If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a connection between relativism and tolerance. But there is a question about whether the position is stable. Wong derived the justification principle from Kant, and Kant rejected MMR. If we were to accept MMR, would we still have reason to accept the justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of considerations quite independent of Kant.
In any case, this argument would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the justification principle. The argument does not establish that there is a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T is true in some societies and false in others.
In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism (2006), Wong has argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable, any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them, preserve relationships with them, etc. Wong's defense of accommodation is immune to the objection that relativism cannot be a basis for such a universal value because his defense purports to be based on considerations that any adequate morality should recognize. However, for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting the relativist dimension of his position (there is no single true morality), it argues from the non-relativist dimension (there are universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that one function of morality is to promote social co-operation).
[44] Hence, it is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to accommodation. As was noted in section 3, aside from the philosophical question whether or not some form of moral relativism provides a reason for attitudes such as tolerance, there is the psychological question whether or not people who accept relativism are more likely to be tolerant. As was seen, there is some evidence that relativists are more tolerant than objectivists, and it has been claimed that, even if relativism does not justify tolerance, it would be a positive feature of relativism that acceptance of it makes people more tolerant (see Prinz 2007: 208). Of course, this judgment presupposes that, in some sense, it is good to be tolerant.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COMMENTS:
According to MMR, the truth of moral judgments is relative to societies. The statement that "polygamy is wrong" could be true in one society but false in another.
(1) What constitutes a society (or culture). Are the US and Canada different societies/cultures? Are France and Germany different societies/cultures? That they are different states does not entail that they are different societies/cultures. Germany did not become two societies/cultures when it was divided after WWII (and then become one society/culture again when it was reunified.
Was the ante-bellum American South (which for the most part became the Confederacy in 1861) a different society/culture from the North?
(2) The ER says that right and wrong are relative to the society, and they usually refer to the 'moral code' of the society. What constitutes a moral code? Is it just the beliefs of the majority? But don't people usually think their moral beliefs are justified? They don't believe that X is wrong just because most other people believe it is wrong. Perhaps their moral beliefs are grounded in their attitudes (of approval and disapproval). thus, if most people in a society disapprove of divorce, then divorce is wrong according to the moral code of that society.
(3) Should we be concerned about things that destroy a society? That depends upon what we mean. It is sometimes said that the survival of a society depends upon its ability to preserve its customs and traditions. But let's be careful. First, we should, of course, care about the fate of individuals (whether they live or die). But a ‘society’ (whatever that is) is not identical to the people who happen to live in it at any given time. Second, it would be a mistake to assume that a society (however it is defined) cannot change without becoming a different society. Southern society was radically changed by the Civil War, but was it a different society? (Isn’t the right answer: parts of it changed; parts of it remained the same.) Societies are not so rigid that they cannot survive dramatic changes. (American society has changed immensely since 1920, but isn't it still the same society? Letting women vote didn't destroy American society, did it?) Third, we shouldn't identify a society with its moral code such that any change in the moral code entails that the earlier society has been destroyed and been replaced by a new society. Societies/cultures evolve (and over time they can evolve quite a bit--ask your grandparents) as the world changes and new challenges arise. Whether the change is good or bad depends on the nature of the change. (Can the ethical relativist say that it is bad for the moral code of a society to change?)
(4) We should not assume that a society and its moral code are monolithic. They may themselves contain quite a bit of diversity. A few decades ago there was a lively debate about 'Asian values,' but what are 'Asian values.' Do all Asian countries have the same values? Weren't (and aren't there big differences between Chinese culture and Indian culture? (And is 'Chinese culture' monolithic?)
What is the "American moral code"? (Is there one?) Is it just a matter of what most Americans believe? But doesn't that change over time (do you have the same moral beliefs as your parents, or do you think for yourself?) Often there is debate within the society/culture about what is right. See "The Case of Sandra Lovelace v. Canada," pp. 456ff, in your textbook, International Human Rights Law.
8. Relativism and Tolerance
Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position, usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards those with whom they morally disagree. The most prominent normative position in this connection concerns tolerance. In recent years, the idea that we should be tolerant has been increasingly accepted in some circles. At the same time, others have challenged this idea, and the philosophical understanding and justification of tolerance has become less obvious (see Heyd 1996 and the entry on toleration). The question here is whether moral relativism has something to contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR or MMR provide support for tolerance (for discussion, see Graham 1996, Harrison 1976, Ivanhoe 2009, Kim and Wreen 2003, Prinz 2007: pp. 207-13 and Wong 1984: ch. 12). In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. The context of discussion is often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does moral relativism provide support for tolerance in this sense?
Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers generally think they are mistaken. DMR may provide the occasion for tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory or even permissible. DMR simply tells us there are moral disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. (A mixed position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.)
It might be said that MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even this is problematic. According to MMR, understood to [42] concern truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society. Hence, the statement, “people ought to be tolerant” (T), may be true in some societies and false in others. MMR by itself does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact have the result that T is false in some societies (a similar point may be made with respect to justification).
Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can establish this as an objective moral truth (for example, by drawing on arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill). To the objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance (or imperialism), objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should interfere with it. Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance.
Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle alone. Such an approach has been proposed by Wong (1984: ch. 12). The principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them (if they were rational and well-informed in relevant respects). Wong called this “the justification principle.” Of course, it is already a tolerance principle of sorts. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct. Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is false and unjustified in another society in which the press is restricted for the good of the community. In this case, given MMR, our society might not be able to justify interference to the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any justification we could give would appeal to values that are authoritative for us, not hem, and no appeal to logic or facts alone would give them a reason to accept our justification.
If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a connection between relativism and tolerance. But there is a question about whether the position is stable. Wong derived the justification principle from Kant, and Kant rejected MMR. If we were to accept MMR, would we still have reason to accept the justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of considerations quite independent of Kant.
In any case, this argument would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the justification principle. The argument does not establish that there is a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T is true in some societies and false in others.
In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism (2006), Wong has argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable, any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them, preserve relationships with them, etc. Wong's defense of accommodation is immune to the objection that relativism cannot be a basis for such a universal value because his defense purports to be based on considerations that any adequate morality should recognize. However, for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting the relativist dimension of his position (there is no single true morality), it argues from the non-relativist dimension (there are universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that one function of morality is to promote social co-operation).
[44] Hence, it is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to accommodation. As was noted in section 3, aside from the philosophical question whether or not some form of moral relativism provides a reason for attitudes such as tolerance, there is the psychological question whether or not people who accept relativism are more likely to be tolerant. As was seen, there is some evidence that relativists are more tolerant than objectivists, and it has been claimed that, even if relativism does not justify tolerance, it would be a positive feature of relativism that acceptance of it makes people more tolerant (see Prinz 2007: 208). Of course, this judgment presupposes that, in some sense, it is good to be tolerant.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COMMENTS:
According to MMR, the truth of moral judgments is relative to societies. The statement that "polygamy is wrong" could be true in one society but false in another.
(1) What constitutes a society (or culture). Are the US and Canada different societies/cultures? Are France and Germany different societies/cultures? That they are different states does not entail that they are different societies/cultures. Germany did not become two societies/cultures when it was divided after WWII (and then become one society/culture again when it was reunified.
Was the ante-bellum American South (which for the most part became the Confederacy in 1861) a different society/culture from the North?
(2) The ER says that right and wrong are relative to the society, and they usually refer to the 'moral code' of the society. What constitutes a moral code? Is it just the beliefs of the majority? But don't people usually think their moral beliefs are justified? They don't believe that X is wrong just because most other people believe it is wrong. Perhaps their moral beliefs are grounded in their attitudes (of approval and disapproval). thus, if most people in a society disapprove of divorce, then divorce is wrong according to the moral code of that society.
(3) Should we be concerned about things that destroy a society? That depends upon what we mean. It is sometimes said that the survival of a society depends upon its ability to preserve its customs and traditions. But let's be careful. First, we should, of course, care about the fate of individuals (whether they live or die). But a ‘society’ (whatever that is) is not identical to the people who happen to live in it at any given time. Second, it would be a mistake to assume that a society (however it is defined) cannot change without becoming a different society. Southern society was radically changed by the Civil War, but was it a different society? (Isn’t the right answer: parts of it changed; parts of it remained the same.) Societies are not so rigid that they cannot survive dramatic changes. (American society has changed immensely since 1920, but isn't it still the same society? Letting women vote didn't destroy American society, did it?) Third, we shouldn't identify a society with its moral code such that any change in the moral code entails that the earlier society has been destroyed and been replaced by a new society. Societies/cultures evolve (and over time they can evolve quite a bit--ask your grandparents) as the world changes and new challenges arise. Whether the change is good or bad depends on the nature of the change. (Can the ethical relativist say that it is bad for the moral code of a society to change?)
(4) We should not assume that a society and its moral code are monolithic. They may themselves contain quite a bit of diversity. A few decades ago there was a lively debate about 'Asian values,' but what are 'Asian values.' Do all Asian countries have the same values? Weren't (and aren't there big differences between Chinese culture and Indian culture? (And is 'Chinese culture' monolithic?)
What is the "American moral code"? (Is there one?) Is it just a matter of what most Americans believe? But doesn't that change over time (do you have the same moral beliefs as your parents, or do you think for yourself?) Often there is debate within the society/culture about what is right. See "The Case of Sandra Lovelace v. Canada," pp. 456ff, in your textbook, International Human Rights Law.
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