24 Donnelly on Slavery in Saudi Arabia
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Third Edition (Cornell University Press, 2013)
To intervene or not to intervene, that is the question.
“Suppose that in contemporary Saudi Arabia a group were to emerge arguing that because slavery was accepted in the early Muslim world it should be reinstituted in contemporary Saudi Arabia. I am certain that most Saudis, from the most learned clerics to the most ordinary citizens, would reject this view. How, though, should this group be dealt with?
So long as these fundamentalists do not attempt to practice slavery, dialogue--including harsh criticism by both Saudis and foreigners--seems to [115] me the appropriate route. Those in the majority have, I think, a moral obligation to use the most forceful possible terms. Nonetheless, freedom of belief and speech requires the majority to tolerate these views, in the minimal sense of not imposing legal liabilities on those who hold or express them. Should they attempt to practice slavery, however, it would be entirely appropriate, and probably even demanded, that the force of the law be applied to suppress and punish it.
Suppose, though, that the unthinkable were to occur and the practice of slavery were reintroduced in Saudi Arabia--not, let us imagine, as a matter of law, but rather through the state refusing to prosecute slave-holders. Here we run up against the state system and the fact that international human rights law gives states near total discretion to implement internationally recognized human rights within their own territories. Although one might argue that slavery is legally prohibited as a matter of jus cogens , general principles of law, and both customary law and treaties, coercive international enforcement would be, at best, extraordinarily contentious and without much legal precedent. Outsiders, however, remain bound by their own moral principles (as well as by international human rights norms) to condemn such practices in the strongest possible terms and foreign states would be entirely justified in putting whatever pressure short of force they could mobilize on Saudi Arabia to halt the practice.
This hypothetical example illustrates the fact that some cultural practices demand our condemnation rather than our respect. It also, however, indicates that some beliefs, although despicable, demand our toleration--because freedom of opinion and belief is an internationally recognized human right. So long as one stays within the limits of internationally recognized human rights, one is entitled to at least a limited and grudging toleration, and the personal space that comes with that.
Many cases, however, are not so “easy,” especially where change is substantial or unusually rapid. In much of the global South—and pockets of the developed world as well--we regularly face the problem of “modern” individuals or groups who reject traditional practices. Should we give priority to the idea of community self-determination and permit the enforcement of customary practices against modern “deviants,” even if this violates “universal” human rights? Or should individual self-determination prevail, thus sanctioning claims of universal human rights against traditional society?”
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Third Edition (Cornell University Press, 2013)
To intervene or not to intervene, that is the question.
“Suppose that in contemporary Saudi Arabia a group were to emerge arguing that because slavery was accepted in the early Muslim world it should be reinstituted in contemporary Saudi Arabia. I am certain that most Saudis, from the most learned clerics to the most ordinary citizens, would reject this view. How, though, should this group be dealt with?
So long as these fundamentalists do not attempt to practice slavery, dialogue--including harsh criticism by both Saudis and foreigners--seems to [115] me the appropriate route. Those in the majority have, I think, a moral obligation to use the most forceful possible terms. Nonetheless, freedom of belief and speech requires the majority to tolerate these views, in the minimal sense of not imposing legal liabilities on those who hold or express them. Should they attempt to practice slavery, however, it would be entirely appropriate, and probably even demanded, that the force of the law be applied to suppress and punish it.
Suppose, though, that the unthinkable were to occur and the practice of slavery were reintroduced in Saudi Arabia--not, let us imagine, as a matter of law, but rather through the state refusing to prosecute slave-holders. Here we run up against the state system and the fact that international human rights law gives states near total discretion to implement internationally recognized human rights within their own territories. Although one might argue that slavery is legally prohibited as a matter of jus cogens , general principles of law, and both customary law and treaties, coercive international enforcement would be, at best, extraordinarily contentious and without much legal precedent. Outsiders, however, remain bound by their own moral principles (as well as by international human rights norms) to condemn such practices in the strongest possible terms and foreign states would be entirely justified in putting whatever pressure short of force they could mobilize on Saudi Arabia to halt the practice.
This hypothetical example illustrates the fact that some cultural practices demand our condemnation rather than our respect. It also, however, indicates that some beliefs, although despicable, demand our toleration--because freedom of opinion and belief is an internationally recognized human right. So long as one stays within the limits of internationally recognized human rights, one is entitled to at least a limited and grudging toleration, and the personal space that comes with that.
Many cases, however, are not so “easy,” especially where change is substantial or unusually rapid. In much of the global South—and pockets of the developed world as well--we regularly face the problem of “modern” individuals or groups who reject traditional practices. Should we give priority to the idea of community self-determination and permit the enforcement of customary practices against modern “deviants,” even if this violates “universal” human rights? Or should individual self-determination prevail, thus sanctioning claims of universal human rights against traditional society?”
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