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14 Are there any universally valid moral rights?

I used to give the students in my introductory ethics class a “Morality Quiz” on the first day of class (before we had discussed anything) to find out what they thought about a multitude of moral and metaethical questions. I tabulated their answers to five questions over eight semesters (in the last decade). Here are the results.


(13) There are no universally valid moral principles, i.e., principles which apply to all persons at all times.

TRUE: 245 (50.1%)
FALSE: 244

(15) It is always wrong to torture someone just for the fun of it.

TRUE: 448 (91%)
FALSE: 42

(16) One should be tolerant of the moral beliefs of others.

TRUE: 410 (89%)
FALSE: 52

(17) If everyone in a society thinks that it is wrong to do X, then it is wrong to do X in that society.

TRUE: 301 (61%)
FALSE: 189

If you got at least a “C” in your Logic class (or if you didn’t need to take logic because you already knew how to be logical), you should be able to see that there seems to be a contradiction between “True” answers to Q13 and Q15: Q15 purports to be a universally valid moral principle, and a “True” answer to Q13 denies there are any such things.

I didn’t ask about universally valid moral rights, but I would imagine that, if I had, the results would have been much like the results for Q13. But a huge majority would have also said that people did have a universally valid moral right against being tortured just for the fun of it.

It is also hard to reconcile a “True” answer to Q15 with a “True” answer to Q17 (which is close to a good statement of ethical relativism). What if everyone in a society thought that torture was morally permissible, how could you then say they were wrong if you answered “True” to Q15?

Toleration is very popular. But doesn’t Q16 assert something that purports to be a universally valid moral principle? And if Q17 is true, then how can you say that everyone ought to be tolerant of the beliefs of others?

Here is a perfect statement of ethical relativism:

 (18) What is right and wrong is relative to society. The very same action can be right in one society and wrong in another, even when performed in otherwise identical circumstances.

TRUE: 406 (81%)
FALSE: 95

I don’t know why more said “True” to Q18 than to Q17. I admit that Q17 is kind of crude, but if you think Q18 is true, then what makes something right in one society and wrong in another? Isn’t it because they have different moral codes, and moral codes are essentially a matter of belief?

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